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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DIAMOND T UTAH, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintif !-Appellant, 
vs. 
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
a corporation authorized to do 
business in the State of Utah, 
PACIFIC FINANCE, INC., a 
corporation authorized to do 
business in the State of Utah, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 
10951 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, TRAVELERS 
INDEMNITY COMPANY 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action on a contract of insurance between 
the plaintiff-appellant, Diamond T Utah, Inc., and the de-
fendant-respondent, Travelers Indemnity Company. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At pretrial defendant, Travelers Indemnity Company, 
moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff and de-
fendant Travelers stipulated that there was no material 
issue of fact in the issue of liability on an insurance policy 
and that the depositions herein be published and that all of 
the written agreements of the parties hereto be made a part 
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of the record herein. The Court entered an order upon the 
stipulation and set a day for the submission of briefs and for 
oral argument on defendant's motion. The plaintiff-appel-
lant, Diamond T Utah, amended the pretrial order to include 
a motion by it for summary judgment to be heard at the 
same time as Travelers Indemnity Company's motion. The 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, heard the arguments of counsel and reviewed 
the pleadings and published depositions herein as provided 
in Rule 12 (b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and awarded to 
the defendant, Travelers Indemnity Company, summary 
judgment dismissing the plaintiff's complaint against it 
with prejudice and upon the merits of the complaint. (R. 
111-112) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-respondent, Travelers Indemnity Company, 
seeks affirmation of the summary judgment of the District 
Court entered in its favor. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As to the joined issues between Travelers Indemnity 
Company, hereinafter referred to as Travelers, and Dia-
mond T Utah, Inc., hereinafter ref erred to as Diamond 
T, there is no material issue of fact concerning the 
issue of coverage of risks provided in the insurance policy. 
In the District Court, Travelers' motion to dismiss which 
was treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 
12 (b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and Diamond T's mo-
tion for summary judgment placed the construction of the 
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written contract of insurance before the Court. That con-
tract of insurance and the depositions of 0. J. Wilkinson, the 
president and owner of all of the shares of stock, except for 
"qualifiers for incorporation" (R-152), of the plaintiff cor-
poration, contain all of the agreements upon which the plain-
tiff relies by stipulation between Diamond T and Travelers 
and by the order of the District Court entered upon said 
stipulation (R-38). Between Diamond T and Travelers the 
only disputed issue of fact is the value of the tractor-trailer. 
Diamond T cannot create an issue of fact concerning the 
coverage of the contract of insurance between Diamond T 
and Travelers on appeal which is the gravamen of Diamond 
T's complaint against Travelers. Mastic Tile v. Acme Distri-
buting Co., 15 U.2d 136, 389 P.2d 56 (1964) ; Richards v. 
Anderson, 9U.2d17, 337 P.2d 59 (1959). 
Travelers does not disagree with the facts in the state-
ment of facts in Diamond T's brief. Travelers submits that 
Diamond T does not limit its argument to its statement of 
facts, the record in the case at bar and the pleadings in this 
case. All of the declarations of purported facts by Diamond 
T in its argument must not be considered as material issues 
of fact under this Court's decision in Mastic Tile v. Acme 
Distributing Co. and Richards v. Anderson, supra. For the 
Court's convenience Travelers submits further uncontested 
material facts omitted from Diamond T's brief with a re-
statement of the facts in appellant's brief as necessary for 
clarity. 
Diamond T and Travelers entered into a contract of 
insurance. (R-181) The contract of insurance contained an 
"automobile dealer's endorsement". (R-184) The endorse-
ment in part provides : 
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"It is agreed that such insurance as is afforded 
by the policy applies subject to the following pro-
visions: 
"l. Property Covered--The policy covers auto-
mobiles (a) consigned to or owned by the insured and 
held for sale or used in the insured's business as an 
automobile dealer including repair service or as 
demonstrators, exclusive of automobiles leased or 
rented to others, and automobiles sold by the insured 
under bailment lease, conditional sale, purchase 
agreement, mortgage or other encumbrance; ... " 
(Emphasis added) 
"INTERESTS AND AUTOMOBILES INCLUDED 
New Used 
Automobiles Automobiles 
Insured's Interest Only No Yes" 
The policy then describes the sales locations of the 
dealers. The policy provides certain conditions for "unnamed 
locations". Attached to the "automobile dealer's endorse-
ment" is an automobile dealer's "drive-away" collision cover-
age endorsement which places certain limitations and con-
ditions upon the transportation of the automobiles covered 
by the policy. (R 184-186) 
The policy did not become effective until January 27, 
1961, which is the first day of the policy period defined in 
paragraph VII as follows : 
"This policy applies only to direct and accidental 
losses to the automobile which are sustained during 
the policy period ... " (R. 181, 182) 
Before the commencement of the policy period, Dia-
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mond T sold a 1952 trailer and a 1953 tractor to David 
Scott under a written conditional sales contract dated the 
23rd day of January, 1961. (R-146) 
On the same day, January 23, 1961, Diamond T assigned 
its interest in the contract to Pacific Finance Company, 
hereinafter called Pacific. (R-148) 
Pacific and Diamond T had an agreement (R-148) 
wherein it was provided: 
". . . I (Diamond T) agree that if the assignee 
shall repossess said property for failure of the pur-
chaser to perform any of the conditions of said con-
tract (conditional sales contract), and shall deliver 
said property to my (Diamond T's) place of business 
within (90) days after the due date of the oldest un-
paid installment ... per contract, I will pay the bal-
ance remaining under said contract within thirty 
(30) days after delivery, or on demand at election of 
assignee .... I (Diamond T) understand that title 
to said property remains in the assignee (Pacific) 
until the contract balance shall be fully paid ... " 
In the conditional sales contract and in an agreement to 
furnish insurance, Diamond T, Pacific and the conditional 
purchaser agreed to cause insurance covering "fire, theft and 
physical damage" to the tractor and trailer. (R-146, 147, 
148) In the conditional sales contract the purchaser, Scott, 
promised to cause insurance coverage for said property 
damage or theft. (R-146) The insurance coverage provided 
by the conditional sales contract was purchased. (R-22, 
23) That insurance against fire, theft and physical damage 
was not in force at the time of loss because of non-payment 
of premium. (R-23) 
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The conditional purchaser, David Scott, was in default 
on the conditional sales contract on or about June 16, 1961. 
On that date Pacific took possession of the tractor-trailer at 
Madison, Wisconsin. Pacific caused the tractor-trailer to be 
parked outside a garage in Madison. Scott, the conditional 
purchaser, found the tractor-trailer. Taking advantage of an 
opportunity, he took possession of it. A few days later the 
tractor-trailer was found at the location of an accident in 
which it had been involved. (R-12, 22 and 23) 
Concerning the "repossession" of the tractor-trailer by 
Pacific and in reference to the "assignment agreement" be-
tween Pacific and Diamond T, Mr. 0. J. Wilkinson testified 
at his deposition that Pacific was vested with legal title and 
David Scott was vested with equitable title up until the time 
the tractor-trailer was involved in the accident which caused 
the damage for which Diamond T complains. He said: 
"And they (Pacific Finance) secured the truck 
from a driver, repossessed it from his driver. (R163, 
line 6) 
"The following day he (David Scott, purchaser) 
called me. (R-163, line 12) 
"As I remember he did not have enough money 
to pay it up to date in full and so I told him he would 
have to go to Pacific Finance and work out what-
ever he wanted to do with them and that would be 
the only way that the truck could be released, that I 
would not release it and could not release it, and that 
it was up to Pacific Finance to handle it. (R-163 and 
164) 
"They (Pacific Finance) just called me and told 
me they had picked it (tractor-trailer) up and it was 
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stored in-I don't remember, some little town in Wis-
consin ... that their office (Pacific's) was mailing 
the keys and all, their storage receipt and everything 
to them (Pacific in Salt Lake City) here. And I told 
them, well, when they (Pacific) got that then I 
would go ahead and make arrangements to have it 
picked up. 
"Q. After ... the., truck had been taken, ... do 
you know if Pacific Finance took any further steps 
to locate the units? 
"A. Yes ... " (R-165) 
Diamond T claims the loss of the tractor-trailer sold by 
Diamond T under a conditional sales contract to David Scott 
was covered by Travelers' policy (R-11-14). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CONTRACT OF INSURANCE BETWEEN 
TRAVELERS AND DIAMOND T DID NOT COVER 
THE LOSS OF THE TRACTOR-TRAILER BECAUSE 
THE TERMS OF SAID POLICY EXPRESSLY EX-
CLUDED "AUTOMOBILES ... SOLD BY THE IN-
SURED UNDER ... CONDITIONAL SALE" 
The provision in Travelers' "automobile dealer's en-
dorsement" which provided: 
"l. Property Covered. The policy covers auto-
mobiles * * * * exclusive of automobiles * * * * sold 
by insured under * * * conditional sale." 
excluded coverage of the tractor-trailer sold to David Scott 
under the conditional sales contract. 
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The language of the clause in Travelers' policy has been 
construed in several decisions including two cases involving 
repossessed automobiles. 23 ALR2d 796, 3 ALR2d Later 
Case Service 578 and page 62, 1967 Supplement. 
In Hudiberg Chevrolet, Inc. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 
(Texas) 383 S.W.2d 65 (1964) the same language in an 
automobile dealer's policy was an issue. In that case the 
plaintiff, automobile dealer, had possession of a truck which 
had been repossessed from the dealer's conditional pur-
chaser. The dealer had assigned its interest in the truck 
under the conditional sales contract to GMAC shortly after 
the conditional sale. GMAC had repossessed the truck from 
the conditional purchaser and delivered it to the dealer. The 
conditional purchaser stealthily took possession of the 
truck from the dealer by use of his extra set of keys. The 
dealer apparently had a dealer's agreement with GMAC. 
The dealer paid GMAC the balance the conditional purchaser 
owed on the contract. In reversing the trial court's judgment 
for the plaintiff the Court said: 
"Vehicles insured ... (by the policy) were 
those' (a) consigned to or owned by the insured and 
held for sale or used in the insured's business as an 
automobile dealer * * * * exclusive of automobiles 
* * * sold by the insured under * * * mortgage, con-
ditional sale * *' 
* * * * 
"(T) he truck did not * * become in any sense a 
vehicle 'consigned to or owned by the insured' much 
less one which was 'held for sale or used in the in· 
sured's business'. Furthermore, the vehicle in ques-
tion was encumbered ... The insured's loss was not 
---
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contemplated to be covered nor was it the subject of 
insurance afforded by the policy." 
In Meyer v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. (Texas) 
383 S.W.2d 625 (1964) the contract of insurance between 
the plaintiff and defendant contained the same language as 
the contract of insurance in the case at bar. It was an auto-
mobile dealer's policy. The Court found that the dealer had 
sold the automobile under a conditional sales contract. The 
conditional purchaser damaged the automobile. The dealer 
repossessed the automobile, repaired it and sold it to an-
other. The dealer claimed that he was entitled under the in-
surance policy to recover the amount of damage to the auto-
mobile. The court held that the automobile was sold under a 
conditional sale and thereby excluded from coverage of the 
dealer's policy. 
In Ohio Security Insurance Co. v. Buckeye Union Casu-
alty Co. (Ohio) 178 N.E.2d 817 (1962) two insurance car-
riers sought a declaratory judgment concerning their liabil-
ities under insurance policies. The defendant, Buckeye Union 
Casualty Company, had an automobile dealer's contract of 
insurance with an automobile dealer named Midtown Motors. 
The language of the exclusion of property covered in that 
policy was the same as the language in the Travelers' policy 
in the case at bar. Midtown Motors and the purchaser had 
executed a note and mortgage for the purchase of the auto-
mobile. The purchaser was given possession of the automo-
bile. Midtown Motors had not complied with Ohio's Auto-
mobile Title Act for divesting itself of title. The automobile 
sustained damage while in possession of the purchaser. The 
Court held that Buckeye Union Casualty Insurance Company 
was not liable on its dealer's policy and said: 
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"(T) o hold the automobile was not sold under 
mortgage within the meaning of the language of the 
exclusion clause would just simply be contrary to 
common right and reason." 
The exclusion from coverage of the tractor-trailer sold 
by Diamond T under a conditional sale to David Scott is 
consistent with all of the provisions of the "automobile deal-
er's endorsement". 
The language of the automobile dealer's endorsement 
compels the conclusion that the parties to the insurance con-
tract contemplated that the policy covered loss by physical 
damage and theft of automobiles while "held for sale" by the 
dealer, the insured. 
The coverage commenced when the automobile dealer 
took possession of automobiles as consignee or purchaser 
and owned and held the automobiles for sale to others. Vol. 
11 Couch on Insurance 2d §42 :238 p. 75. The protection 
against loss continued until the dealer sold and delivered 
possession to a purchaser whether the sale was absolute or 
conditional. 23 ALR2d 796; 11 Couch on Insurance 2d 
§42 :238 p. 74. 
The condition precedent to coverage of the risk of loss 
of an automobile under the insurance contract was that the 
automobile be "held for sale" by the dealer. The condition 
precedent of possession by the dealer, insured, was limited 
to two categories of possession by the dealer, to-wit: (1) 
possession as consignee, or (2) possession as owner even 
though the automobile was subject to a "trust agreement, 
bailment, lease, conditional sale, purchase agreement, mort-
gage" between the dealer and the person, firm or corpora-
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tion from whom the automobile dealer may have purchased 
the automobile or with whom the automobile dealer may 
have financed his purchase of the automobile. 
The requirements in the policy for the insured's desig-
nating locations of the places the automobiles are held for 
sale, for permitting the insurer to inspect the insured's 
books and for limiting the conditions and distances of trans-
porting the automobiles, emphasize the kind of coverage the 
automobile dealer was purchasing and the basis of the pre-
mium charge he paid. They were consistent with coverage of 
automobiles "held for sale" but not consistent with auto-
mobiles sold and delivered to a purchaser. 
There was nothing in the insurance policy which indi-
cated that the parties contemplated that the tractor-trailer 
sold to David Scott before the commencement of the policy 
period was "property covered" by the policy. The decisions 
construing the language of a "dealer's policy" under circum-
stances similar to those in the case at bar unanimously hold 
that a policy with the same provisions as Travelers' policy 
in the case at bar did not cover automobiles as the tractor-
trailer sold to David Scott. 
In Diamond T's brief to this Court some hornbook 
phrases concerning the interpretation of insurance contracts 
are paraphrased. Diamond T fails to apply the undisputed 
facts to those principles. In this case the ordinary and natur-
al meaning of the language used should not be perverted or 
twisted into an unnatural or exceptional meaning merely to 
cause coverage. Vol. 3 Couch § 15: 49 p. 738. Especially when 
eradication of the exclusion of automobiles sold and in pos-
session of persons other than the insured would obviously 
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have escalated the amount of premium at the time the parties 
entered into the insurance contract. 
POINT II 
TRAVELERS' CONTRACT OF INSURANCE WITH 
DIAMOND T ONLY COVERED AUTOMOBILES 
"CONSIGNED TO OR OWNED BY THE INSURED 
AND HELD FOR SALE." DIAMOND T DID NOT 
HA VE ANY POSSESSION OF OR INTEREST IN 
THE TRACTOR-TRAILER WHEN IT WAS RE-
POSSESSED BY PACIFIC OR WHEN THE TRAC-
TOR-TRAILER SUSTAINED DAMAGE. 
0. J. Wilkinson, president and practically sole owner of 
Diamond T testified at his deposition that when Diamond T 
sold the tractor-trailer to David Scott under the conditional 
sales contract, Diamond T assigned all of its seller's interest 
in said contract to Pacific. After Diamond T's complete 
divestiture of any interest in the vehicle, Pacific received 
all of the payments Scott made under the conditional sales 
contract. (R-146, 148, 161) Pacific repossessed the tractor-
trailer as holder of legal title. Pacific did not reassign the 
seller's interest in the conditional sales contract to Diamond 
T nor did Diamond T obtain possession of the tractor-trailer 
prior to its damage. (R-164) 
After Diamond T assigned all of its interest in the con-
ditional sales contract it had no interest in the property. In 
American States Insurance Co. v. White, et al, 341 Ill. App. 
Ct. Rpts. 422, 94 N.E.2d 95 (1950) the plaintiff insurance 
company claimed that it had no liability under its insurance 
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policy on the ground that the insured was not the owner of 
the automobile. In considering the effect of a bill of sale by a 
conditional seller executed after the conditional seller had 
assigned its interest in a conditional sales contract to GMAC 
for the same automobile the Court reasoned: 
"Furthermore, if the alleged bill of sale were 
executed after Rock River Motors (conditional sell-
er) assigned the conditional sales contract to GMAC, 
it was, a fortiori, a nullity, for then Rock River 
Motors (conditional seller) would not have even had 
the right to receive the balance of payment for the 
car." 
This Court has decided in Stains v. Peterson, 74 U. 256, 
279 P. 53 (1929) and in Harrison v. Otto Securities Co., 70 
U. 11, 257 P. 677 (1927), that an assignment of the condi-
tional seller's interest in a conditional sales contract trans-
fers all of the conditional seller's rights in the property sold 
under the conditional sales contract. After the assignment of 
the conditional seller's interest the rights in the property are 
exclusively vested in the conditional purchaser and the 
assignee of the conditional seller. 
The agreement between Pacific and Diamond T did not 
give Diamond T any interest in the property before its loss. 
Pacific may have elected to proceed under several condi-
tions of the contract, none of which would vest an interest 
in the tractor-trailer in Diamond T before the loss for which 
plaintiff complains. Pacific and Diamond T expressly agreed 
in their agreement as follows: 
"I (Diamond T) understand that title to said 
property remains in the assignee (Pacific) until the 
contract balance shall be fully paid .... " 
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It is undisputed that Diamond T did not pay the con-
tract balance to Pacific nor have possession of the tractor-
trailer before the accident in which the vehicle was damaged. 
In its brief Diamond T irrelevantly and erroneously 
argues that it had an insurable interest in the tractor-trailer. 
The issue in this case is whether that interest, if any, was 
insured. 
The decisions cited by the attorney for Diamond T in its 
brief have no relationship whatsoever to the issues at bar. 
In Fish v. Connecticut Fire Insurance Co. (Wisc.) 5 N.W.2d 
779 (1942) the policy of insurance had different provisions 
from the one in the case at bar and the plaintiff, insured, 
owned the chattel. In Pratt v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. (R.I.) 
146 A. 763 (1929) the insurance policy insured the condi-
tional vendor, the conditional vendee and the assignee of the 
conditional vendee. In that case the insurance policy specific-
ally provided that all three were named insureds. The pro-
visions of the policy in that case were completely different 
from the conditions in the policy in the case at bar. The policy 
in that case was the kind of policy Diamond T, Pacific and 
Scott agreed to furnish, and did purchase; but they permitted 
it to lapse for nonpayment of premium before the loss. In 
Union Insurance Society v. Sudduth (Ala.) 103 S. 845 (1925) 
the record revealed that the conditional seller was named in 
the "encumbrance" clause of a policy which had completely 
different provisions from the dealer's policy in the case at 
bar. In Hassett v. Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. (Wash.) 
273 P. 745 (1929) the plaintiff, insured, purchased a policy 
insuring him against "all direct loss or damage which he 
may sustain by the disposal or concealment of said auto-
mobile by the said vendee with intent to defraud the said 
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vendor" which is apparently what caused the loss of the 
property sold to said vendee in that case. The decisions in 
Germania Fire Insurance Co. v. Turley, (Ky.) 179 S.W. 
1059 (1915) and Home Insurance Co. v. Chowning (Ky.) 
233 S.E. 731 (1921) involved fire insurance policies cover-
ing damage to real property. In both of those cases the in-
surance policies were completely different from the insur-
ance policy in the case at bar. 
The appellant's attorney in Diamond T's brief does cite 
a case which is almost in point and which is helpful to the 
defendant, Travelers. That decision is Fountain v. Importers 
and Exporters Insurance Co. of New York, (Wisc.) 252 
N.W. 569 (1934). In that case a conditional seller of auto-
mobiles assigned his interest in conditional sales contracts 
after the conditional purchasers took possession of the 
automobiles sold under the contracts. The conditional seller, 
Fountain, had a contract of insurance with the defendant 
insurance company which expressly covered automobiles 
subject to an equitable mortgage. Conditional purchasers of 
some automobiles had apparently defaulted on their con-
tracts of conditional sale. The automobiles had been re-
possessed and they were held for sale on Fountain's lot. A 
fire destroyed the automobiles. The trial court found that 
Fountain, the automobile dealer, had an insurable interest 
in the repossessed cars. The Court reversed the judgment of 
the trial court. In connection with the automobile dealer's 
insurable interest, the Court said: 
"As to the . . . repossessed cars, we are of the 
opinion that, under the evidence as it stands, it does 
not appear that Fountain (auto dealer) had an in-
-urnble interest therein. * * * * Fleming (assignee) 
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kept an account respecting each of the cars (which) 
shows that four of the repossessed cars were settled 
for and paid for by Fountain (dealer) when they 
were sold. From this alone the inference would be 
that Fountain had no further interests in a car after 
it was sold, and Fleming's (assignee's) charge 
against him therefor was fully paid. The ownership 
in a car after it was sold was no longer in Fountain 
(dealer), but in the purchaser. Fleming's (as-
signee's) lien thereon remained, for he held the sale 
papers and kept the certificate of title in his posses-
sion after having the sale recorded in the Secretary 
of State's office, and the right to repossess it for 
breach of conditions of sale was in Fleming (as-
signee), not Fountain (dealer)." 
Diamond T did not have an insurable interest in the 
tractor-trailer purchased by David Scott under the Fountain 
decision cited by appellant in its brief. The record and 
decisions cited by Travelers compel the conclusion that Dia-
mond T did not have an interest in the tractor-trailer sold 
to David Scott after its assignment to Pacific. Diamond T 
had completely divested itself of any interest in that prop-
erty. It did not become vested with any interest before the 
time of loss. And, more significantly, the tractor-trailer was 
not an "automobile consigned to or owned by the insured 
and held for sale" as proscribed by the insurance policy. 
POINT III 
THE TRACTOR-TRAILER PURCHASED BY DAVID 
SCOTT WAS SUBJECT TO THE CONDITIONAL 
SALES CONTRACT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCI-
DENT IN WHICH THE TRACTOR-TRAILER SUS-
TAINED DAMAGE AND WITHIN THE EXCLU-
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SION OF "AUTOMOBILES SOLD UNDER CONDI-
TIONAL SALE" IN TRAVELERS' POLICY. 
The conditional sales contract under which Diamond T 
sold the tractor-trailer to David Scott provided for seller's 
remedies in case of default by the conditional purchaser. 
The "seller" at the time of loss was .Pacific as assignee of 
all of the Diamond T's rights in the contract. (R-146) Under 
the contract Pacific could repossess the chattel and sell the 
chattel at a public or a private sale. It could apply the pro-
ceeds of the sale on the balance owing on the contract and 
claim any deficiency from the conditional purchaser or pay 
to the purchaser the amount of the proceeds from said sale 
in excess of the balance owing on the contract. Those pro-
visions gave the purchaser an interest which has not termi-
nated. Correlative to the seller's contract right to repossess 
and sell the chattel is the duty to obtain a reasonable value 
for the chattel which must be applied on the balance owing 
by the purchaser. 
The conditional sales contract permitted the purchaser 
to pay the entire balance owing which would vest him with 
both legal and equitable title in the chattel and divest any 
right of Pacific in the chattle. 
None of the rights of Pacific and Scott were extin-
guished prior to the accident in which the tractor-trailer 
sustained damage. 
In Jones v. Brown, (Ga.) 134 S.W.2d 440 (1963) the 
legal title holder repossessed the chattel from the plaintiff 
and sold it to a third party. The legal title holder subse-
quently accepted a late payment from the plaintiff. After 
the late payment was accepted, plaintiff sued for possession 
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of the chattel. In discussing the rights of the equitable 
owner, plaintiff, under the contract the Court said: 
"The plaintiff at the time of the institution of 
this suit did not have legal title, but she did have a 
special property interest entitling her to pursue the 
action, which was the value of the goods over and 
above the amount of the debt. She did not have a 
right to recover the property itself without paying 
the debt (which she could have done by a prior 
tender of the amount due, or during the trial at the 
time of electing a property judgment) or she could 
recover on the basis of the special property right by 
electing a money judgment for the difference. * * * * 
* * * * 
"The owner of property who conveys by a bill of 
sale to secure a debt owing by him to a creditor is 
in the same legal situation as one who purchases 
property from a vendor who retains title until the 
purchase price is paid; in both situations the right of 
possession depends upon compliance with the terms 
of the contract." 
In an action to recover a deficiency on a conditional 
sales contract after sale of the repossessed automobile sold 
under the contract this Court decided in Jens en's Used Cars 
v. Rice 7 U.2d 276, 323 P.2d 259 (1958) that a contract as 
the conditional sales contract in the case at bar continues 
until the judgment for deficiency and other contractual 
obligations expressed in said contract unless the parties 
agree upon a modification prior to judgment. 
The insurance policy in the case at bar excluded auto-
mobiles sold by conditional sale. The conditional sales con-
tract for the tractor-trailer in the case at bar continues to be 
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binding upon the parties to it and their assignees. The 
tractor-trailer was not property covered by the insurance 
policy at the time of its loss. 
POINT IV 
DIAMOND T EITHER ASSIGNED ITS INTEREST 
IN THE CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACT TO 
PACIFIC OR IT DID NOT ASSIGN ITS INTEREST. 
IF IT DID NOT ASSIGN ITS INTEREST THERE 
WAS NO REPOSSESSION. IF THERE WAS NO RE-
POSSESSION, THE TRACTOR-TRAILER WAS 
STILL UNDER THE CONDITIONAL SALE AT THE 
TIME OF LOSS. IF IT ASSIGNED ITS INTEREST 
IT HAD NO INTEREST. IN EITHER EVENT, 
TRAVELERS' POLICY DID NOT COVER THE 
LOSS. 
Diamond T is caught in a dilemma. If it did not assign 
its interest in the conditional sales contract to Pacific Fi-
nance thereby causing Pacific to be vested with legal title, 
Pacific had no right to receive the payments from David 
Scott and it had no right to repossess the tractor-trailer. 
The repossession by Pacific would not have been a valid 
repossession. If there were no repossession David Scott 
would still be the conditional purchaser entitled to drive it 
away from the place it was parked by Pacific in Madison, 
Wisconsin. The Travelers' policy would not cover the risk of 
loss of the tractor-trailer because the tractor-trailer was sold 
under a conditional sales contract as provided in the ex-
clusion of "property covered" phrase in the policy. On the 
other hand, if Diamond T assigned its interest in the tractor-
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trailer to Pacific, Diamond T did not have any interest in 
the tractor-trailer at the time of loss. All of the decisions are 
unanimous. 
In Hudiburg Chevrolet, Inc. v. Globe Indemnity Co. 
(Tex.) 383 S.W.2d 65 (1964) the seller assigned all of his 
interest in an automobile to the finance company, GMAC, 
which repossessed the automobile from the purchaser and 
delivered it to the dealer from whose possession the pur-
chaser surreptitiously took the automobile and damaged it. 
The dealer paid GMAC the balance owing on the contract. 
The Court held that a "dealer's policy" only insured vehicu-
lar property and the dealer had no interest in the lost auto-
mobile. The cases annotated at 23 ALR2d and 3 ALR2d 
Later Case Service p. 578 unanimously hold that an insur-
ance policy as Travelers' policy does not cover property sold 
under conditional sale. 
POINT V 
DIAMOND T'S UNCONDITIONAL GUARANTEE 
WAS A CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY NOT COV-
ERED BY TRAVELERS' "AUTOMOBILE DEAL-
ER'S ENDORSEMENT." 
The record clearly indicates that the parties in this 
litigation did not contemplate that Travelers' "dealer's en-
dorsement" covered any liability of Diamond T on its un-
conditional guarantee of its conditional purchaser's obliga-
tions to its assignee, Pacific. Pacific and Diamond T made 
provision for other insurance covering sold automobiles in 
which Pacific and possibly Diamond T would have been 
named as a loss payee in the policy. (R-147) There was such 
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a policy covering the tractor-trailer but it lapsed prior to 
the loss. 
Under Travelers' "dealer's endorsement" the only 
coverage provided Diamond T was loss of an interest in 
automobiles which it "held for sale as owner'' and which had 
not been sold and delivered under a contract of conditional 
sale. The fact that the insured, Diamond T, had contractu-
ally obligated itself to make payment to Pacific if a condi-
tional purchaser failed to make payment to Pacific had no 
effect on the liability of Travelers under the policy. Trav-
elers insured Diamond T against loss of property not against 
its contractual liability to Pacific. Hudiburg Chevrolet, Inc. 
v. Globe Indemnity (Tex.) 383 S.W.2d 65 (1964) 
CONCLUSION 
Travelers' "dealer's endorsement" and policy did not 
insure Diamond T against the loss of the tractor-trailer it 
sold under conditional sale to David Scott. Summary judg-
ment for Travelers against Diamond T should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
L. RIDD LARSON 
Attorneys for Travelers Indemnity 
Company 
Defendant and Respondent 
